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Russia and Kazakhstan: Mutually Different Interests 
for Regional Leadership
Dmitry Malyshev and Elnara Bainazarova
This chapter concerns itself with the mutually different policies through 
which two countries that both pursue leadership in Central Asia, namely 
Russia and Kazakhstan, each respond to the security threats that they per-
ceive as arising from Afghanistan. The first section, written by Dmitry 
Malyshev, discusses two dimensions in Russian policies: the re-
establishment of bilateral relations with Kabul, and the specific emphases in 
policy in Russia’s relations with its close allies amongst the Central Asian 
republics—Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This examination shows 
how Russia is preparing itself to meet the security challenges in the region 
and the way in which the development of relations with Afghanistan is part 
of a wider belt of flexible security arrangements. The second section in the 
chapter, written by Elnara Bainazarova, deals with the development assis-
tance through which Kazakhstan sharpens its policy profile and contributes 
to the solution of the security problems in Afghanistan and the more impov-
erished Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s most im-
portant allies in the entire post-Soviet space, and although the interests of the 
two countries diverge on issues such as the future direction of Eurasian inte-
gration, they coincide on the threats that both perceive is presented for the 
entire Central Asian region due to the current condition of Afghanistan. 
However, the policies of the two countries arise from mutually different in-
terests: Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the region for reasons related 
to its economy and the security of its own zonal borders; whereas Kazakh-
stan is in the process of building not only a regional but also a more globally 
oriented profile by spearheading policies that generate prestige for it within 
the international community. While for Russia Afghanistan is a threat that 
should bring Central Asia together under its security leadership, for Kazakh-
stan it is not only a direct security threat but also presents a crucial question 
mark in relation to its possibilities to expand economically and, consequent-
ly, to expand the space for its independent policies.
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Russia: Preparing to Contain the Threats from 
Afghanistan 
Although the final move to completely withdraw the U.S. forces from Af-
ghanistan has been postponed several times due to the deteriorating security 
situation in the country, the change that is being brought about in the years 
2014–2016 is already drastic: For the first time since the U.S. intervention in 
Afghanistan in September 2001 and the establishment of the NATO-led in-
ternational coalition by a UN Security Council resolution in December 2001, 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will take full responsibility for 
fighting the Taliban and other militant insurgent groups within the country.1
Simultaneously serious doubts persist about the effectiveness of the Afghan 
army and its ability to confront the Taliban, which insists on the uncondition-
al withdrawal of all foreign forces and promises to continue the armed strug-
gle “as long as the last foreign soldier does not leave Afghanistan.”2 Casual-
ties have risen dramatically since the handover of security responsibilities to 
Afghan forces.3 Experts have argued that even if the Taliban loses in popu-
larity among the population in Afghanistan, its military capability remains 
considerable with some 25,000–30,000 experienced insurgent combatants.4
According to the information that was released by the Afghanistan Contact 
                                                          
1 The U.S.-led coalition ended its combat mission in Afghanistan in December 2014. Three 
months later, and following a request by Afghanistan’s President Ashraf Ghani, President 
Obama announced the suspension of the previous plan that had aimed to reduce the number 
of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 5,500 by the end of 2015. Patrick Goodenough, “Obama 
Slows Down Drawdown After Afghan President Asks That U.S. Troops Stay Longer,” CNS 
News, March 24, 2015, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-
goodenough/obama-slows-down-drawdown-after-afghan-president-asks-us-troops-stay;
“Ashraf Ghani: U.S. Critical To Afghanistan’s Future,” National Public Radio, March 22, 
2015, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2015/03/22/394660553/ashraf-ghani-u-s-
critical-to-afghanistans-future. Also Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, “The Im-
portance of the U.S.-Afghanistan Alliance,” Washington Post, March 20, 2015,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-importance-of-the-us-afghanistan-
alliance/2015/03/20/faecf0de-cf06-11e4-a2a7-9517a3a70506_story.html.
2 “NATO: 1 Service Member Killed in Afghanistan ‘Enemy Attack’,” Associated Press, July 
28, 2014, http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_AFGHANISTAN?SITE=AP&
SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2014-07-28-06-18-34.
3 “What Kind of Afghanistan Will Foreign Forces Leave?,” BBC, December 17, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-25410582.
4 Farhod Tolipov, a researcher from Uzbekistan, assures that “the Taliban’s popularity among 
the population of the IRA today is only about 3%.” Russian International Affairs Council,
“Tsentral’naia Aziia–Afganistan-2014: v zone povyshennoi otvetstvennosti,” April 21, 
2014, http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=3553#top.
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Group of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in July 2014, about 
40 percent of Afghanistan’s territory is controlled by the Taliban and some of 
its leaders are closely cooperating with al-Qaeda.5 One year later, various 
Taliban groups had pledged to associate with the Islamic State (IS) either 
openly or clandestinely, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had 
announced its allegiance to the IS, and government officials in Afghanistan 
reported IS militant activity in the provinces of Ghazni, Kunduz and Faryab 
in central and northern Afghanistan.6 The International Crisis Group reported 
that as the international military effort winds down “a resilient insurgency 
demonstrates its clout countrywide, particularly in rural areas.”7 These con-
cerns also leave Russia and the Central Asian states facing new challenges: 
the possible collapse of the Kabul regime which the U.S. has helped to set up 
and the subsequent revenge meted out by the Taliban and radical Islamists—
a new chaos followed by a new round of armed confrontations. 
This section examines the emerging pattern of Russian policies as Mos-
cow prepares for increased uncertainty over the political future of Afghani-
stan. The focus is, first, Russia’s policies towards Afghanistan and, second, 
its policies in Central Asia, where three countries—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan—are Russia’s close military and political allies in the Collec-
tive Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the processes of economic 
integration within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This dis-
cussion delves into how a multidimensional arrangement of practices with 
multiple paths of cooperation is being developed in order to contain the in-
stability and violence in Afghanistan and to prevent its spillover into the 
Central Asian republics. Zones of fortified security are being created around 
Afghanistan, and especially on its northern border, by multilateral (CSTO, 
SCO) and bilateral security cooperation and also by the means provided 
through other international cooperation to counteract the multifaceted threats 
of terrorism, Islamic extremism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and un-
controlled migration. While Russia avoids direct military involvement in Af-
                                                          
5 “Taliby zakhvatyvaiut vlast’ v Afganistane,” Izvestiia, July 17, 2014. The Afghanistan 
Contact Group of the SCO was established in Beijing on November 4, 2005.
6 Jan Agha Iqbal, “IS Threatens Afghanistan Peace Hopes,” Asia Times, March 5, 2015, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-01-050315.html. 
7 International Crisis Group, “Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition,” Asia Report,
no. 256 (May 12, 2014): 1, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/
afghanistan/256-afghanistan-s-insurgency-after-the-transition.aspx.
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ghanistan, it seeks to develop cooperation with the government in Kabul in 
security matters and supports the economic development of the country.
Russian Policies on Afghanistan: Objectives for the Immediate 
Future
Russia’s concerns about Afghanistan are reflected in its official Foreign Poli-
cy Concept that was approved in 2013:
“The ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and the forthcoming withdrawal of interna-
tional military contingents from the country pose a great security threat to Russia 
and other CIS members. The Russian Federation together with Afghanistan and 
concerned countries, the United Nations, the CIS, the CSTO, the SCO and other 
multilateral institutions including Russia-NATO projects, will make consistent 
efforts to find a just and lasting political solution to the problems faced by this 
country with due respect for the rights and interests of all its ethnic groups and 
achieve a post-conflict recovery of Afghanistan as a peace-loving sovereign neu-
tral state with stable economy. Comprehensive measures to reduce terrorist threat 
from Afghanistan and eliminate or reduce illicit drug production and traffic in a 
significant and measurable manner will be an integral part of those efforts. Rus-
sia is committed to further intensifying international efforts under the auspices of 
the UN aimed at helping Afghanistan and its neighboring states to meet these 
challenges.”8
An inclusive government system (“due respect for the rights and interests of 
all its ethnic groups”) and neutrality are Russia’s long-standing objectives in 
a number of post-Soviet conflicts which have become sites for the rival inter-
ests of Russia and the Western states, for example in Ukraine and Moldova. 
In relation to Afghanistan Russia has kept a low profile; the emphasis of its 
action lies on the other side of the Amu Darya and Panj Rivers—in the for-
mer Soviet republics where it seeks to contain the threats from Afghanistan 
and to also maintain a strategic balance towards the U.S. military influence in 
Afghanistan.
Simultaneously the present uncertainties about the future of Afghanistan 
are lowering the political borderline which was set upon the river in 1989 
                                                          
8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Concept of the Foreign Policy of 
the Russian Federation, approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12
February 2013,” http://mid.ru/bdomp/nsosndoc.nsf/ e2f289 bea62097f9c325787a0034c
255/0f474e63a426b7c344257b2e003c945f!OpenDocument. 
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when the Soviet Union pulled back to this line and ended its then almost one-
decade-long effort to gain control of Afghanistan. Addressing a meeting of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization in October 2014, President Vla-
dimir Putin stressed that Afghanistan “can count on Russia’s support after 
the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan.” “We understand that the 
withdrawal of the international military contingent will not make the situa-
tion easier,” Putin said and expressed Russia’s commitment in yet undefined, 
metaphoric terms: “[…] in case of necessity, we will be ready to lend our 
friends in Afghanistan a shoulder to lean on in order to keep the situation in 
this country stable and with perspectives of development.”9 From April 11, 
2013, Afghanistan has been an observer state to the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the CSTO.
Russia’s immediate priority is to prevent Islamist militants from infiltrat-
ing the Central Asian republics and to terminate the colossal drug trade from 
Afghanistan via the Central Asian republics to Russia.10 In this connection, 
the practical meaning of lending “a shoulder to lean on” seems clear: by 
strengthening defense in the proximity of the borders of Afghanistan, Russia 
helps to prevent the insurgents from seeking shelter in these regions where 
they could prepare new attacks on Afghan territory. While this is a task that 
Russia and its allies prepare for in all cases—irrespective of whether insur-
gents will cross borders because the government in Kabul remains in power 
or because it fails to do so—being ready to lend a shoulder tells about a new 
active approach to cooperation on these issues. 
A few months later, in February 2015, Ambassador Alexander Manty-
tskiy in a meeting with the second Deputy Chief Executive Officer of Af-
ghanistan Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq expressed the wish of Russia’s authori-
ties to enhance interaction with Afghanistan in order to stabilize the situation 
in the region. Russia offered to conclude an agreement with Afghanistan on 
cooperation in the field of security. Deputy Chief Executive Officer Mohaqiq 
welcomed the idea that Moscow could take measures against the threat of the 
                                                          
9 Nasir Azizi, “Russia to Help Support Afghanistan Post-2014,” TOLOnews, November 7, 
2014, http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17038-russia-to-help-support-afghanistan-
post-2014.
10 According to Viktor Ivanov, the Director of the Federal Drug Control Service, “[…] the 
south, Central Asia, is the main direction [from which these drugs are coming].” “Afghan 
drugs inundate Russia—Federal Drug Control Service,” Interfax, September 13, 2013, 
http://rbth.com/news/2013/09/13/afghan_drugs_inundate_russia_-_federal_drug_control _
service_29790.html.
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expanding influence of the Islamic State in the region.11 Even if Russia con-
tinues to reject ideas about being directly militarily involved in Afghanistan, 
such cooperation will open a new phase in its participation in the fight 
against international terrorism and extremism beyond the territories of the 
states that are its allies in Central Asia. In relations with Afghanistan, the 
Western withdrawal is giving a boost to the re-establishment of relations 
which has been taking place very slowly after a standstill of almost a quarter-
century.
Leaving Behind the Burden of the Past 
Russia’s approaches on Afghanistan have been heavily influenced by the 
negative experience of its own history: the Soviet-Afghan war (1979–1989) 
that resulted in the loss of 15,000 Soviet troops. The events of that war have 
not been forgotten by the Russian public, and Moscow’s decision-makers 
have been firm on the point that Russia’s military forces will not be involved 
in Afghanistan again. However, the fact that Moscow’s policies towards Af-
ghanistan have shown little willingness to take anything but a minimum of 
risks and to keep avoiding any direct intervention in Afghanistan’s affairs 
has not prevented Russia from cooperating with ISAF under the Russia-
NATO agreement ratified in May 2007. Most importantly, Russia has al-
lowed the coalition forces—the “Western military bloc” in Russian par-
lance—to use Russian territory to transfer their troops and cargo including 
heavy weaponry and combat aircraft.12 Russia has also directly assisted the 
government in Kabul by donating helicopters and other equipment for mili-
tary uses. Nevertheless, the determination not to send troops has remained 
consistent over the past twenty-five years; hence any speculation that Russia 
could advocate the idea that the Western coalition should be replaced by the 
forces of the CSTO or the SCO member states is merely hypothetical. 
The traumatic memory of the Soviet-Afghan war in Russian society and 
the lack of bilateral relations after the Soviet withdrawal has kept Moscow 
                                                          
11 “Rossiia gotova podpisat’ soglashenie s IRA o sotrudnichestve v sphere bezopasnosti,”
Afghanistan.ru, February 23, 2015, http://afghanistan.ru/doc/82594.html.
12 In 2011 the Coalition requested Russia’s cooperation in the withdrawal of the troops and 
equipment from Afghanistan, and a logistic center was built near the city of Ulyanovsk. 
However, both Russia and NATO decided against making Ulyanovsk a hub for this purpose 
due to the excessive costs involved. 
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and Kabul at a distance from each other. Omar Nessar, Director of the Rus-
sian Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan and editor-in-Chief of the 
web-site “Afghanistan.ru,” explains: 
“Bilateral relations between Moscow and Kabul were under severe pressure from 
Russian domestic political factors. Over many years, the media and expert com-
munity produced a negative image of post-Communist Afghanistan, introducing 
it as an “American project” for Russian public opinion. Moreover, in Kabul anti-
Russian elements had frozen Russia’s initiatives to establish economic and hu-
manitarian ties with the country. The relevant government agencies of the Rus-
sian Federation clearly lacked the political will to develop bilateral relations. 
This was primarily because in Russia’s foreign policy direct bilateral relations 
with Afghanistan did not possess any kind of priority.”13
No signs of change could be seen until 2012, when a joint Russian-Afghan 
Commission on trade and economic cooperation was established that provid-
ed an institutional basis for the economic partnership of the two countries. As 
a result of this new opening, Russia has started a gradual “return to Afghani-
stan” and increased its economic cooperation and development assistance for 
infrastructural projects and humanitarian14 cooperation. In Afghanistan the 
improved relationship has brought back memories about previous coopera-
tion. Former President Hamid Karzai is amongst those who have commented 
positively on the Soviet model. “The Soviet money went to the right place 
and they were efficient in spending their resources through the Afghan 
government,” Karzai said in an interview to the Washington Post in March 
2014.15 During the International Conference on Afghanistan in London in 
2010, where the participating states were requested to contribute with 
development assistance to help stabilize Afghanistan, the Russian delegation 
                                                          
13 Omar Nessar, “Evoliutsiia Afganskoi politiki Moskvy,” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, January 26, 
2015, 9 (translation by Dmitry Malyshev). 
14 In Russian linguistic practice, ”humanitarian” does not only refer to relief work; the word 
has the broader connotation of being focused on human beings instead of state structures 
and institutions.
15 Office of the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, “Full Transcript of Presi-
dent Karzai’s Interview with Washington Post,” March 5, 2014,
http://president.gov.af/en/news/full-transcript-of-president-karzais-interview-with-
washington-post; Kevin Sieff, “Interview: Karzai Says 12-year Afghanistan War Has Left 
him Angry at U.S. Government,” Washington Post, March 2, 2014,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interview-karzai-says-12-year-afghanistan-war-
has-left-him-angry-at-us-government/2014/03/02/b831671c-a21a-11e3-b865-
38b254d92063_story.html.
250
proposed to reconstruct or modernize more than 140 facilities that had been 
built as part of the Soviet Union’s development assistance and that had been 
destroyed in the civil war of the early 1990s.16 The Kabul House-Building 
Factory is one of these Soviet-era projects; another is the Russian Center of 
Science and Culture in Kabul, which was originally built in 1982.17
In addition to such “goodwill” projects that are visible to the public and 
are meant to improve the popular image of the donating country, Russia has 
contributed to Afghanistan’s economy by canceling more than $11 billion of 
Afghanistan’s sovereign debt during the decade that followed the ouster of 
the Taliban regime in autumn 2001.18 The legacy of Soviet-era development 
assistance—from the time when Russia was the most important donor coun-
try for Afghanistan—also plays a positive role in Russia’s readiness to partic-
ipate in the international donor community to support Afghanistan’s devel-
opment. At the International Conference on Afghanistan in Bonn in 2011, 
foreign minister Sergey Lavrov emphasized that Russia was “ready to make 
large investments” in major infrastructure projects in the region, such as the 
Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India pipeline project (TAPI) and the 
Central Asia–South Asia transmission line project (CASA-1000).19
These two projects are the key elements in implementing the U.S.-
initiated idea of “New Silk Roads” to enhance economic development in Af-
ghanistan (see the contribution by Mika Aaltola and Juha Käpylä in this 
book). Beyond this there are several other plans for infrastructure develop-
ment in South and Central Asia which specifically suit Russia’s interests in 
developing rail and transportation networks in the wider region. One is the 
1,340-kilometer-long road and rail line to connect Pakistan’s Chitral with 
Dushanbe, which would bring into the twenty-first century the idea of the old 
trade routes connecting the Muslims and Hindus of the Indian subcontinent 
with the Tajiks. Another is a road and rail link between Islamabad and the 
                                                          
16 Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko, “Afghanistan: A View from Moscow,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2010, 27,
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/trenin_afghan_final.pdf.
17 The new building complex opened in fall 2014 at a reported cost of $20 million; it includes 
auditoriums, a library of Russian literature, a concert hall, a multi-media center, and sports 
and leisure facilities.
18 Nick Allen, “Russia, the USSR and Afghanistan, Yesterday and Today,” Russia Beyond the 
Headlines, 2014, http://rbth.com/longreads/afghanistan.
19 Andrei Dörre and Tobias Kraudzun, “Persistence and Change in Soviet and Russian Rela-
tions with Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 31, no. 4 (December 2012): 425. The article 
provides an extensive analysis of Soviet-era development assistance to Afghanistan.
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Ferghana Valley; this would provide Russia with access to Pakistani ports, 
and Pakistan with access to markets in Central Asia and Siberia. For Russia, 
just as for other major states, the international task of developing Afghani-
stan is intertwined with the interest for projects which are being developed 
independently of Afghanistan but gain significant normative legitimacy from 
it in international contexts. In bilateral relations with Afghanistan the gradual 
resumption of economic cooperation and Russia’s support of the efforts of 
the Western international community to create stability in Afghanistan 
through infrastructure development has paved the way for a type of security 
cooperation with strategic significance for the capability of Russia and its 
allied countries to maintain stability to the north of Afghanistan. 
Security Arrangements in Central Asia and Beyond 
Central Asia is a region which Russia, as phrased by Dmitri Trenin and 
Alexei Malashenko, “seeks to keep within its orbit.”20 However, the meta-
phor of the planet carving out its sphere of influence determined by the 
gravitational forces of power reveals very little about the ties that bind this 
space together. The argument frequently formulated in Russian policy-
making circles is that if Russia were to withdraw its military presence from 
Central Asia and cease being interested in maintaining its economic influence 
in this region, such a course of action would inevitably affect Russia itself 
because of the economic interconnectedness and structural interdependence 
built during the Soviet decades. It is generally observed that over the past ten 
years the economic importance of Central Asia has in fact increased because 
the region provides ample opportunities for Russian business and its military-
industrial complex. Central Asian supplies of uranium are needed to run Rus-
sia’s nuclear power stations, and Russia is interested in building closer coop-
eration with the region’s oil and gas exporters (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan). In addition to energy, investment priorities include commu-
nications and traditional industries such as cotton.21
While maintaining influence in the region is seen to serve Russia’s eco-
nomic capacity and, hence, its status as a great power, it is also understood as 
                                                          
20 Trenin and Malashenko, “Afghanistan,” 15.
21 Gennadii Chufrin, Rossiia v Tsentral’noi Azii (Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic 
Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2010), 75–99.
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a necessity dictated by geography: due to Russia’s very long land borders 
and the specific threats emerging from this region, the Russian Federation’s 
national security  depends crucially on stability in Central Asia. Decision-
makers and politicians emphasize that because the traditional and non-
traditional security threats stemming from Central Asia affect Russia much 
more directly and acutely than they do any other state beyond the region, 
Russia cannot ignore them. The drug problem with its pronounced marks in 
the population is an example. Russian officials and politicians have repeated-
ly expressed their concerns over the immense increase of narcotics produc-
tion during the twelve years of ISAF’s presence in Afghanistan.22
Because geography is seen to tie the Central Asian states to the “Afghan 
issue,” these states are expected to cooperate in order to counter terrorism, 
extremism, organized crime and drug trafficking. Simultaneously it is recog-
nized that these states do not have a sufficient capacity to accomplish such 
tasks alone. Russia sees itself to be in the position to provide such assistance; 
it recognizes its responsibility in Central Asia and tries to operate ahead of 
developments by using the variety of policy tools made possible by the multi-
level structure of cooperation within the CSTO and the economic integration 
projects led by Russia in the region. It is emphasized that Russia’s special 
position and responsibilities in relation to Central Asia follow from the fact 
that Russia, unlike the other resource-rich states providing external assistance 
in the region, has a vital interest to stop the drug traffic and fight against ter-
rorism and religious extremism in the region. Russia’s interests in the stabil-
ity of Afghanistan are consequently interwoven with these regional interests; 
and this makes Russia’s participation in the development of Afghanistan 
much more than the symbolic act of a responsible member of the internation-
al community led by the Western states.23
Russia’s economic as well as security cooperation in Central Asia is a 
combination of bilateral and multilateral relations. Due to a combination of 
                                                          
22 Despite years of international efforts to restrain drug production in Afghanistan, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in its report in 2014 finds that opium pro-
duction in Afghanistan “has increased dramatically.” “Gripped by electoral crisis, Afghani-
stan needs ‘statesmanship, not brinksmanship’—UN envoy,” UN News Centre, June 25, 
2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48130#.U60vHbGtxX0. During
his visit to Kabul in December 2013 Sergey Naryshkin, Speaker of the Russian State Duma, 
underlined that: “Narcotics production [has] increased 44 times in the 12 years that ISAF 
has been present in Afghanistan.” Allen, “Russia.”
23 President of Russia, “Meeting with members of political parties represented in the State 
Duma,” August 14, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46451.
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historical, political-diplomatic and strategic reasons, it is considered rational 
to develop multidimensional economic cooperation with the Central Asian 
states. While bilateral relations continue to have their own dynamic, particu-
lar attention is being paid to strengthening integration processes within the 
frame of the CIS, i.e. the formation of a single economic space by following 
the two tracks of a free economic zone and the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EEU, another common abbreviation is EAEU).24 Similarly, security cooper-
ation is a combination of multilateral policies in the frame of the CSTO and 
bilateral relations with Russia’s allies and partners. The result is a flexible 
system in which the two sets of relations can be mutually supportive; howev-
er, such a system also easily breeds controversies and generates confusion. 
This, in turn, highlights the importance of leadership and decision-making. 
According to its 2013 foreign policy concept, Russia’s major objectives 
in Asia include: “establishing itself as a key transit country between Europe 
and Asia,” “participating in and shaping regional integration processes,” and 
“improving the regional security environment.”25 It is easy to see that Ka-
zakhstan’s geographic position and active political role in the region make it 
a key partner for Russia as Moscow’s decision-makers seek to realize these 
objectives. Among all former Soviet republics, Kazakhstan stands out as a 
“success story.” In spite of its complex multiethnic composition it has pre-
served its political stability and become one of the leaders of economic 
growth. From a Russian perspective Kazakhstan’s geographic position makes 
it both a “buffer” and a “gateway” between Russia and the other countries in 
Central Asia. The large landmass of the country separates the territory of the 
Russian Federation from the “troublesome South.” In the geo-economic 
sense, this geographic position makes the country a nexus point for the trans-
it of energy and mineral resources to both western and eastern markets. 
Moreover, Kazakhstan’s resource potential is very large due to its access to 
the oil and gas deposits in the Caspian Sea. Additionally, it has large stock-
piles of uranium; and in Russia, their import is considered a strategic interest. 
In international political cooperation Kazakhstan is one of Russia’s most 
important economic partners amongst the CIS member states, and in Russia 
President Nursultan Nazarbayev is recognized to have played a vital role in 
the advancement of Eurasian integration with landmark decisions on the 
                                                          
24 Gennadii Chufrin, Ocherki evraziiskoi integratsii (Moscow: Ves’ mir, 2013), 128.
25 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Concept of the Foreign Policy.”
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EEU (2014) and, before this, on the Eurasian Customs Union (which has 
been established in several stages since 1995). Because Kazakhstan and Rus-
sia both are in the key position to stimulate this process, the effectiveness of 
policies requires that Russia increasingly coordinates initiatives with Ka-
zakhstan. Kazakhstan is close to Russia also because it has the second largest 
number of ethnic Russians amongst all post-Soviet republics: 23.7 percent of 
the total population (Ukraine ranks first with about 40 percent). This connec-
tion no longer exists in the case of the other Central Asian states. For all 
these reasons the maintenance of the political stability that has become part 
of Kazakhstan’s good reputation and diplomatic prestige among the Central 
Asian states is crucially important to Russia. 
Because Kazakhstan possesses considerable military potential, the two 
states’ cooperation in the efforts to secure Central Asia’s southern borders 
has great burden-sharing importance for Russia. Much important materiel 
created by Soviet military and industrial structures was produced in Kazakh-
stan, and Russia has much at stake in maintaining the connections developed 
over decades between the enterprises of the two countries. Russia has a sig-
nificant role in re-equipping Kazakhstan’s national defense force, and both 
countries are actively participating in the creation of an integrated multi-level 
security system in Central Asia. Although Kazakhstan, which is rich in oil 
and other natural resources, does not need external assistance, cooperating 
with Russia gives it the opportunity to play a crucial role in maintaining se-
curity in the neighboring states and, as a consequence, around its own bor-
ders. However, although both countries have grave concerns about the 
growth of potential threats to Central Asian security arising from Afghani-
stan, it is Russia which bears the main burden in assisting the countries di-
rectly bordering Afghanistan—Tajikistan in the first place—to repel the 
threats. 
Tajikistan’s president, Emomali Rakhmon, has repeatedly emphasized 
the need to raise wide-based international support for the protection of the 
border towards Afghanistan. Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov recon-
firmed Russian policy in July 2014 by stressing that Tajikistan and Russia 
“are going to take these measures as bilateral within the framework of the 
full implementation of the relevant decisions of the CSTO.”26 In the next 
                                                          
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Statement for the mass media by 
the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, during the joint press conference summaris-
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spring Russia and Tajikistan carried out joint drills in the Badakhshan region, 
where the borderline runs through mountainous areas that greatly complicate 
border protection along Tajikistan’s 1,340-kilometer-long borderline with 
Afghanistan.27 Deputy Defense Minister Anatoly Antonov’s decision was 
firm after he visited Dushanbe in January 2015: Russia would assist Tajiki-
stan in modernizing and strengthening its armed forces and reinforce its 201st
military base in the country.28 While the Russian base already has branches 
near the Afghan border south of Dushanbe (in Khatlon and Qurghonteppa), 
the transborder Badakhshan region is the most under-populated and inhospi-
table region for enforcing border control; yet it is also a region in which Rus-
sia has long-term experience, unlike any other state contributing to border 
security in Tajikistan: in the Soviet period this was a border region not only 
with Afghanistan to the south but also with China to the east. In addition to 
military cooperation Russia has also assisted Tajikistan by re-equipping its 
border troops (on the issue of the return of Russian border guards to Tajiki-
stan’s southern border, see the contribution by Rytövuori-Apunen and Us-
monov in this book).
Nevertheless, it is Kyrgyzstan which is the largest recipient of Russian 
loans and grants. During President Putin’s visit to Bishkek in September 
2012, Russia wrote off Kyrgyzstan’s $500 million debt. This was part of a 
comprehensive agreement on the terms of strengthening Russia’s military 
presence in Kyrgyzstan. The deal includes the Kant airbase, the underwater 
weapons-testing site in Karakol, the military center in Kara-Balta, and the 
radio-seismic laboratory in Mailuu-Suu. Although Kyrgyzstan is not in the 
immediate geographic proximity of Afghanistan, Moscow’s decision-makers 
emphasize that this small republic is not capable of confronting the security 
challenges emerging from Afghanistan on its own and that its geographic 
position leaves it with no other sustainable solutions but to rely on Russia.
                                                                                                                            
ing the results of the negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Sirodjidin Aslov, Dushanbe, 30 July 2014,” July 30, 2014,
http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/F803762237E567CB44257D2700203ECF.
27 “Na rossiiskoi 201-i baze v Tadzhikistane budut obuchat’ mestnykh voennykh,” Lenta.ru,
January 21, 2015, http://lenta.ru/news/2015/01/21/201_base. The military contingent of the 
base and their families have a status equal to the administrative staff of the Embassy of the 
Russian Federation. According to the agreements concluded during the official visit of Rus-
sian President Vladimir Putin in Tajikistan (October 5–6, 2012), the 201st Russian military 
base located in Tajikistan will be maintained until 2042.
28 “Rossiia usilit voennuiu bazu v Tadzhikistane,” Lenta.ru, January 27, 2015, http://lenta.ru/
news/2015/01/27/militarycamp/.
256
Russia intensified its military and economic presence in the Kyrgyz Republic 
after major riots related to ethno-political conflict and power struggle once 
again (after the instability of the early 1990s) struck the country in spring 
2010 and continued to simmer in the years that followed. Russia’s economic 
presence is evident in the fact that Russian companies are the largest inves-
tors in the country’s energy sector. Development assistance plays a very mi-
nor role in Russian policies on Central Asia and is mainly to be found in debt 
relief for the two countries with fewest resources, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
In addition, there is the general form of humanitarian cooperation consisting 
of scholarships for youth from all over the region to study in Russian institu-
tions of higher education.29
The territory of the Kyrgyz Republic is a nodal point not only in the 
north-south axis—in relation to Afghanistan—but also towards the east, in 
order to control China’s expansion in the energy economy of the region. Ever 
since Russian policies started their “turn” towards Asia the paramount im-
portance of China has been steadily growing, both as a cooperation partner 
and as a rival in the infrastructure industry; and also India, Pakistan and Iran 
are becoming increasingly significant for the Russian economy and in terms 
of political cooperation. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is the main 
regional frame for cooperating with China, and this organization is extending 
its geographic scope considerably with the membership of India and Pakistan 
(which both entered the formal membership process in July 2015) and also of 
Iran (once the UN sanctions relating to Iran’s nuclear program cease to ap-
ply). While the military cooperation of the CSTO in Central Asia has shrunk 
to only three states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), the SCO is 
gaining in importance as the far wider regional frame for developing cooper-
ation in non-traditional security threats—drug trafficking, terrorism and ex-
tremism. Although the backbone of Russia’s defense arrangements in Central 
Asia is still formed by the CSTO with its Russian military bases in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan as well as Russia’s aim to establish joint regional air defense 
systems with all three countries, the SCO offers a much wider arena for 
specific forms of cooperation between groups of countries.
In Afghanistan Russia, like the Soviet Union previously, has emphasized 
cooperation in the northern areas of the country, where the ethnic composi-
                                                          
29 V. M. Sergeev, A. A. Kazantsev, and V. I. Bartenev, Assisting Development in Central 
Asia: Strategic Horizons of Russian Engagement (Moscow: Russian International Affairs 
Council, 2013), 37.
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tion of the population is largely Tajik and Uzbek. Focusing on these northern 
areas means that Russia continues to build its future influence in Afghanistan 
on the close ties it developed with the Northern Alliance. These ties did not 
suddenly emerge from Russian opposition to the Taliban but have a history 
which goes back to the first decades of the Soviet Union (see the chapter by 
Rytövuori-Apunen and Usmonov in this book). In his aforementioned ad-
dress to the CSTO meeting in October 2014, President Putin specifically re-
ferred to “our friends” in Afghanistan. This undoubtedly refers to those who 
are able to establish contacts for mutual interest, but this historical context 
also must be taken into account in order to grasp the full meaning of Putin’s 
words. If we interpret the “shoulder to lean on” against the backdrop of the 
historically much wider zonal border represented by the historical ethnic 
connections that exist across the Panj and Amu Darya Rivers, it also entails 
support for a type of political development that secures the position of the
Tajik and Uzbek populations within Afghanistan’s system of  government.
As a consequence, Russia’s present policy objectives to develop wider 
regional cooperation include not only the Central Asian states; they also en-
vision India and Iran as allies in the efforts to support non-Pashtun ethnic 
groups to consolidate their representation in top-level power structures in 
Afghanistan and, thus, to contain the expansion of the Taliban in the north by 
political means. Relations with “friends” lead to the development of a zonal 
border extending across the formal border and help to solve security prob-
lems more effectively than could be accomplished by trying to create imper-
meable borderlines. Moreover, it is not only along Afghanistan’s border with 
Tajikistan that support provided to Tajiks and Uzbeks can be functional for 
Central Asian security. Currently Russia cannot envision the establishment of 
a military base in Uzbekistan, yet the security threats for which it must pre-
pare include the possibility that insurgents from Afghanistan, and especially 
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, may try to break into Uzbekistan and 
threaten also Tajikistan from the territory of neighboring Uzbekistan. Ever 
since the IMU swore allegiance to the leadership of the Islamic State in 
summer 2015, it has come to make much sense in Moscow to extend defens-
es across the Panj and the Amu Darya and to do so by means that do not in-
volve military troops. Staying on this path requires sophisticated skills as 
well as well-functioning networks with other countries. Hence, it is no coin-
cidence that Russia is also in the process of developing security cooperation 
with Pakistan, as Tahir Amin explains elsewhere in this book. The key ques-
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tion for the success of these policies is how the conflicts between pairs of 
countries—starting with Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan and India, and 
including also U.S.-Russia relations—can be managed or held in abeyance 
through the cooperation required by the emerging war front.
Kazakhstan: Policies for Regional Leadership in 
Development
This section explores the ways in which Kazakhstan is building a policy pro-
file of its own through its contributions to the international efforts to stabilize 
Afghanistan and to enhance development and cooperation in Central Asia.
Kazakhstan is one of only two Central Asian countries classified as an 
“upper-middle-income” economy by the World Bank (the other is energy-
rich and traditionally isolationist Turkmenistan), and it alone amongst the 
Central Asian states has been ranked by the UNDP as a country with “high 
human development” since 2013 (the four other Central Asian states are 
ranked as countries with “medium,” and Afghanistan with “low,” human 
development).30 The positive image gained by investing not only in 
economic growth but also in the education and health of its people has 
prompted Kazakhstani policy-makers to sharpen foreign policy with a 
distinct emphasis on “soft” power, that is, a values-driven leadership in the 
region that serves Kazakhstan’s own interests of modernization and 
economic integration and also defines how it contributes to international 
efforts that seek to create political stability in Afghanistan. The leap that 
Kazakhstan has taken during the 2010s from being a recipient of 
international development aid to becoming a donor country establishes a new 
basis for its international policies.
In the Third Ministerial Conference of the Istanbul Process on 
Afghanistan held in Almaty in April 2013, President Nursultan Nazarbayev 
stressed that “… the key for solution of Afghanistan [sic] issues is in the 
hands of the Afghan people and the government as the official representative 
                                                          
30 The Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan and Pakistan are “lower middle-income” economies. See
the World Bank Data on Countries and Economies, http://data.worldbank.org/country/; 
United Nations Development Programme, “The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a 
Diverse World, Kazakhstan,” Human Development Report, 2013,
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/KAZ.pdf.
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of the nation. The international community should foster development of the 
inter-Afghan dialogue. Those who demonstrate readiness for the 
establishment of peace and accord in Afghanistan must receive our 
support.”31 Kazakhstan also emphasizes that the full development of any 
inter-Afghan dialogue will be possible only if there is multilateral 
cooperation between regional players. Afghanistan should bring the wider 
region together instead of deepening the involvement of powerful external 
states in its problems. Afghanistan’s instability and development problems 
were considered within the context of regional security in 2010 by the Astana 
OSCE Summit, which declared the concept of “Eurasian security,” and later 
also by the APEC Summit in Vladivostok 2012, where President Putin 
introduced the idea of the flexible involvement of Eurasia in the Asia-Pacific 
region.
Regional cooperation was further boosted after the U.S. shifted its 
policies to emphasize the Asia-Pacific region within its “New Silk Road” 
initiative and China came forward with its concept of the “Silk Road 
Economic Belt.” However, the “New Silk Roads” ideas and the support 
thereof with reference to the need to develop Afghanistan are by no means 
novel; for many years experts in the region have discussed the prospects of 
involving Afghanistan in transport and logistics networks in South and 
Central Asia. Kazakhstan is intent on making the most of these new 
developments, which, in essence, are perfectly matched with its interests: 
should these new networks accelerate economic development in the region as 
envisioned, it will be possible for Kazakhstan to fully develop its potential as 
a transport-logistics hub not only between East and West but also South and 
North. Even in the face of growing competition between external powers, 
Kazakhstan would thus gain leverage to continue in its pursuit of its 
“multivector” foreign policy, which aims to develop close relations with 
multiple states and to expand the political and diplomatic space for its 
independent policies. Consequently, the question of how Afghanistan’s 
future will turn out is much more than merely an issue of regional security 
and stability; it is closely connected with Kazakhstan’s economic prospects 
and the future of its foreign policy. If the security situation deteriorates 
                                                          
31 Central Communications Service under the President of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan,“President addressed Ministerial Conference of Istanbul Process for
Afghanistan,” April 26, 2013, http://ortcom.kz/en/news/president-addressed-ministerial-
conference-of-istanbul-process-for-afghanistan.1223.
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drastically, Central Asia will be kept isolated and Kazakhstan will be 
prevented from gaining access to transport routes from the South. At the 
same time Kazakhstan will be spared from the more dire consequences of a 
process that is the inevitable consequence of the growth in trade cooperation: 
mass migration from Afghanistan, Pakistan and other populous South Asian 
states. However, as this challenge is not likely to diminish in the long term, 
Kazakhstan must prepare policies that ensure the stability of its borders. Its 
location at the heart of Central Asia makes it crucial that it not rely on fence-
building policies but instead maintain close relations with neighboring states 
in a whole range of issues, from economic and political development to the 
maintenance of regional security and stability and countering non-
conventional security threats. The frame for such policies has been prepared 
in the foreign policy concept defined for the years 2014–2020.
The Foreign Policy Concept and ODA Policy
The presidential decree “On the Concept of foreign policy of Kazakhstan for 
2014–2020” explains the strategy of what can be called Kazakhstan’s “soft” 
power. The foreign policy concept was developed in accordance with the 
instructions given in the Address of the President to the Nation “Kazakhstan-
2050 Strategy: New Political Course of the Established State.”32 It is a set of 
principles and approaches, goals and priorities as well as specific tasks of 
foreign activities.33 The key strategic directions of Kazakhstan’s long-term 
development include investment in human development, improvement of the 
institutional environment, development of a science-driven economy, and 
accelerated development of infrastructure. In this context the core idea of 
“soft power” is about investment in human resources: a population with 
knowledge and skills as well as sustained health is considered the best means 
to generate prosperity, the promise of which, again, is needed in order to 
maintain the consensual fabric of society required for peace and stability in 
the geographically largest country in Central Asia and in a state that contains 
                                                          
32 “Address by the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Leader of the Nation, N. 
Nazarbayev ‘Strategy Kazakhstan-2050: New Political Course of the Established State’,”
Official web site of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan, accessed September 28, 2015,
http://www.primeminister.kz/page/article-101?lang=en.
33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan,“Foreign Policy Concept for 
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more than 130 different ethnic groups. Essentially, the foreign policy concept 
is designed to facilitate Kazakhstan’s integration into the international 
community by defining the objective for policies and developing appropriate 
conditions. The positive image that Kazakhstan has gained beyond its 
borders due to its social stability, development record and active diplomacy 
is an asset in promoting this process, especially when expectations about 
increasing prosperity weaken and collective mobilization becomes more 
difficult to maintain. 
Kazakhstani policy has shown itself skillful in combining that which is 
necessary from its own perspective with what is generally desirable and has 
normative value within the international community. It utilizes the good 
reputation which Kazakhstan has gained to increase the credibility of its 
economic capacity beyond its borders and to strengthen the diplomatic 
activity through which its regional leadership becomes manifest. The primary 
element of these policies is the official development assistance (ODA) policy 
established by a law in December 2014.34 The legal basis of the new policy 
envisages a full development assistance program focusing on Central Asia 
and Afghanistan. While the Concept adopted to instruct the activities of 
foreign policy during 2014–2020 makes “near neighborhood” a strategic 
priority, the ODA policy is meant to foster bilateral socio-economic 
cooperation and enhance a more prosperous neighborhood along 
Kazakhstan’s southern borders.35 During the 8th Astana Economic Forum, 
President Nazarbayev reiterated Kazakhstan’s intention to focus on regional 
security issues by addressing the socio-economic needs of countries. This 
profile-sharpening statement gave a boost to setting up the Kazakhstan 
Agency for International Development (KazAID) in order to implement the 
ODA policy. The ODA policy entails that the donor-country role under 
construction is in harmony with Kazakhstan’s national interests: Kazakhstan 
contributes to the stabilization of the socio-economic and political situation 
in its partner countries. Joint action prevents illegal migration flows, drug 
                                                          
34 Zakon Respubliki Kazakhstan Ob ofitsial’noi pomoshchi razvitiiu [Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan On Official Development Assistance], December 10, 2014, published by
Kazakhstanskaia Pravda,
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trafficking and other forms of crime, and it also improves the options 
available in the fight against terrorism and extremism. The role assumed by 
Kazakhstan through its aid policies serves to maintain a “secure 
neighborhood belt” whilst simultaneously strengthening the state’s
international position and its positive image.36
Kazakhstan’s vision for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the policy 
tools by which the interethnic struggle for power and the radicalization of 
religious groups can be mitigated emphasize investment in infrastructure 
projects and social policies that improve the quality of life. Since 2009 the 
government of Kazakhstan has allocated more than $52 million to the 
reconstruction of socially important facilities (schools, hospitals, roads and 
railway lines), the training of Afghan students, support for agricultural 
production, participation in the reconstruction and construction of new dams, 
and the modernization of power plants.37 Economic and humanitarian 
cooperation with Afghanistan is promoted through the Kazakh-Afghan 
intergovernmental commission; and it is achieved by facilitating Kazakh 
production and investment in the Afghan market, and by training Afghan 
experts in Kazakhstan in fields such as economy, industry, finance, transport 
and education. In the frame of a $50 million educational program, up to one 
thousand Afghans are being provided with higher education at Kazakh 
universities in the period of 2010–2020.38 In addition to Afghanistan, aid is 
allocated to improving the border infrastructure at Kyrgyzstan’s border with 
Kazakhstan. Although Kazakhstan’s development assistance focuses on 
Central Asia and Afghanistan, it can also be directed to other regions as part 
of international development assistance in order to attain maximum impact of 
the policy. Examples include the Caucasus, Africa, Latin America, Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS), least developed countries, and landlocked 
countries.
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http://mfa.gov.kz/index.php/ru/vneshnyaya-politika/kazakhstan-i-voprosy-globalnoj-i-
regionalnoj-bezopasnosti/uregulirovanie-situatsii-v-afganistane.
38 “Na obuchenie Afganskoi molodezhi v Kazakhstane vydeleno 50 millionov dollarov SshA
– K. Saudabaev,” Zakon.kz, July 20, 2010, http://www.zakon.kz/178852-na-obuchenie-
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Towards the Smart Power of a Rising Economy 
The operating budget of the ODA technical assistance (that is, aid in tied-
grant form, both bilateral and allocated through multilateral channels) is 
expected to be 0.01 percent of GDP ($15–22 million) in 2012–2016. 
Kazakhstan has also announced the OECD target (which has been set at 0.7 
percent of the GNI) as its long-term perspective and, thus, joined the large 
group of developed countries which, since 1970, have given similar 
statements.39 For reasons relating to Kazakhstan’s own development needs 
and the fact that its ODA policy was formulated only in recent years, the 
contribution on a bilateral basis is still limited in terms of the volume, form 
and geographic scope of the aid. Kazakhstan’s experience of assistance on a 
multilateral basis conducted under the auspices of the UN is much more 
extensive and has included projects in the fields of environment, population, 
health, women’s rights, assistance for landlocked countries, measures to 
curtail the drug trade, etc. In 2012, the disbursements to international 
development assistance agencies amounted to almost $2.8 million. According 
to UN statistics, during 2006–2011 Kazakhstan allocated $53.7 million in 
humanitarian aid, of which $30 million was to Central Asia. With this 
number Kazakhstan ranks third in providing humanitarian aid in Central 
Asia. The sum total of Kazakhstan’s humanitarian assistance during 2006–
2011 is roughly $100 million.40 However, the absence of a systematic 
approach has resulted in low efficiency and poor project management and, 
therefore, has hardly served to lay a basis for the desired outcomes and donor 
image. 
Kazakhstan’s foreign policy representatives and experts are aware that 
development assistance must avoid those mistakes that are commonly made 
when programs designed to improve public administration, build democracy, 
and create good governance are imposed on local populations in recipient 
countries whilst the needs and mentality of these people are left aside. At the 
same time as the operative principles of KazAID emphasize modern norms 
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of transparency, accountability, and ecological and social impact assessment, 
relations with recipient countries are shaped by a traditional style of 
cooperation that present-day experts have gathered under the banner of 
“Asian regionalism.”41 This means that the organization of cooperation is 
seen as a flexible network instead of being fixed by statutes and formal 
agreements; the process itself is of greater importance than are pre-defined 
results. Universal principles are locally applied with decisions made in 
mutual consent, and the style of negotiation is non-confrontational. 
Importance is attached to personal ties rather than to institutional rules, and 
mutual respect is shown in conduct. Unlike the institutional procedures 
typical of Western democracies, these guidelines are considered to allow for 
situational considerations—including the possibility to join or opt out of 
specific projects (which often happens in multilateral contexts where the 
non-formal ties are less binding than in the case of just two parties). In 
countries like Afghanistan which seek to make advances by combining 
modern constitutionalism with the traditions of a tribal society, cooperation 
guided by such flexible and mutually respectful principles is expected to 
have an appeal that extra-regional actors lack. 
Following these guidelines the ODA policy conceptually entails that the 
activity must serve to sustain “good neighborhood” in the proximity of 
Kazakhstan’s borders. The key principles of this policy emphasize an 
individualized approach to each recipient state as well as horizontal 
cooperation models (that is, donor-recipient relations are conducted on an 
equal “win-win” basis). They prioritize technical assistance to transfer 
complex know-how in those areas in which Kazakhstan has a high level of 
competence and make it a requirement that the recipient country expresses its 
interest for a progressive development of such bilateral cooperation. 
However, from a long-term perspective Kazakhstan’s interests lie in region-
wide transport and logistics. In relation to Afghanistan, Astana’s proposal for 
arrangements to enable freight from Afghanistan to use the port of the city of 
Aktau on the Caspian Sea is a notable political gesture to help invigorate 
Afghanistan’s economy. Kazakhstan also has a strategic interest in the 
development of the TAPI pipeline, which provides South Asia with 
Turkmenistan’s natural gas and runs from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and 
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Pakistan and farther to India. The economic network in the region is 
envisioned to engage the countries of Central and South Asia and connect 
them in cooperation with all major economic powers on the Eurasian 
continent—Russia, China, India and Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstan-
Turkmenistan-Iran railway under construction in Kazakhstan since 2009 is 
designed to increase trade from Central Asia to the south tenfold and connect 
southwest Kazakhstan to the Persian Gulf.42 As these commercial interests 
grow stronger, the ODA policy, which in its initial period (2012–2016) 
emphasizes assistance in form of grants, is under pressure to become more 
business-oriented. Consequently, the next ODA period (2017–2020) may 
well emphasize concessional rather than grant aid and raise the share of loans 
(in form of tied credits at favorable conditions) from the 50 percent set for 
the initial period. The pressures for such changes indicate a gradual transition 
from the interpretation of ODA as a tool of “soft” power to seeing it as a tool 
of “smart” power that uses credit for tying together developmental, economic 
and political networks. 
Development assistance thus connects with more than merely the 
security of Kazakhstan’s borders (which is the kind of reasoning that the 
U.S. “Silk Roads” initiative entails); far beyond the monetary contribution 
made in its name, the concept is a vehicle for opening up ways for economic 
integration that strengthens Kazakhstan’s international position. The 
government in Kazakhstan considers soft-power tools such as the ODA 
policy to be efficient foreign policy approaches; and efficiency, again, is a 
way to evaluate and legitimize policies as a means to achieve pre-defined 
ends. Kazakhstan’s development assistance is “soft” power in the sense that 
it is categorically different from the “hard” power of the military cooperation 
that allies Kazakhstan with Russia. However, although such soft-power 
policies are meant to make Kazakhstan attractive in international 
connections, the main characteristic of these policies is not the kind of soft 
power that Joseph S. Nye has in mind when he speaks about a power that 
does not use coercion or payment to induce others to want the same things 
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that the soft-power user wants43; instead, it is power to consolidate 
Kazakhstan itself, both internally as well as in its external policies. Thus, the 
ODA concept is not only greater than the monetary contribution which it 
legitimates but is also, in the context of foreign policy, greater than the field 
of activity that it specifically denotes. Policy concepts are important in 
Kazakhstani political context because they authoritatively instruct policies 
and action; and in the post-Soviet situation, where the presence and influence 
of the former power remains a problem, they are relevant in relation to 
especially Russia. At the same time as Kazakhstan is militarily allied with 
Russia in the CSTO and one of its strategic partners in initiating Eurasian 
economic integration, the question of the future direction that the EEU, 
which has been in force since January 2015, keeps it alert about Russia’s 
intentions. While Kazakhstan cannot stay out of the union that gives it 
considerable influence within the entire CIS area and facilitates its 
cooperation with the former Soviet subjects in its own neighborhood, it also 
resists seeing the EEU as a tool in geopolitical and geo-economical 
competition against the U.S. or China.
Asian Principles of Cooperation and European of Modernization 
In the years following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the “Eurasian” 
identity of the wider region became an issue debated not only in Russia but 
also in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstani discussions focused on the historical 
nomadic features of the region and therefore took a direction different from 
Russia’s “Neo-Eurasian” discourses, which are focused on promoting a 
political identity that is opposed to Western liberal values. This background 
is essential in understanding the difference between Nazarbayev’s “open 
regionalism” and the perspectives on the region as mainly a geographic space 
for exclusive national-cultural projects or great-power aspirations. In 
particular in relation to the EEU, open regionalism envisions a liberal 
economic union that strengthens cooperation and thereby increases mutual 
benefits and also leaves space for developing partnerships and integration 
with other customs unions and organizations of economic cooperation.44
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Instead of aligning itself with any one party, Kazakhstan’s interest lies in 
opening its territory for transport routes in the spirit of its “multivectoral” 
external relations. Any other policy is considered to jeopardize a future that 
prognosticates the Asia-Pacific region as becoming a driving force for global 
economic growth. In order to be able to pursue this policy line Kazakhstan 
has repeatedly emphasized that it considers the Eurasian Union as a purely 
economic integration model.45
Kazakhstan’s approach to political cooperation on security issues 
similarly emphasizes openness and connectedness to counteract bloc-
formation. An important conclusion that it has drawn from its chairmanship 
of the OSCE in 2010 is that the participants in this organization recognize 
that eleven of its 57 members are in Asia and that, as a consequence, the 
“Euro-Asian” security dimension must complement the “Euro-Atlantic” 
dimension within the organization’s programs and activities. The idea of 
wide “continental” security had already motivated President Nazarbayev’s
initiative in 1992 in convening the Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). This initiative was inspired 
by the “confidence-building” approach that had been elaborated to facilitate 
East-West cooperation in European political and arms control contexts 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The specific rationality of the approach then had 
been that the build-up of tensions could be proactively prevented by 
increasing transparency and communication through regular institutional 
interaction, and that this process would gain in momentum and become self-
sustaining. When Kazakhstan started its ambitious programs of social and 
economic modernization in the 2010s, the idea that tasks could be 
accomplished by generating processes through a set of rules was elaborated 
as a policy tool to define planned steps for implementing the programs. The 
top-down management tool drew its inspiration from the exact sciences and 
was termed “algorithm.” The basic idea has been to design ordered sets of 
steps by means of which Kazakhstan would become able to meet global 
challenges with the limited time and resources that are available. 
The idea of improving the accomplishment of tasks also inspires 
Kazakhstan’s views on multilateral organizations in the region. According to 
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President Nazarbayev, the efficiency of the activities of these organizations 
can be increased by implementing “the best international practices, both 
Asian and European.”46 The effectiveness of this “algorithm” is envisioned 
to show itself in the advances made in the mega-projects initiated in the areas 
of transport infrastructure and energy in a number of regional organizations 
and, especially, in the SCO advised by its “Shanghai Spirit.” The specific 
“Asian” principles of cooperation—that is, universally applicable principles 
of cooperation and a flexibility of organization that allows optional 
participation in specific areas of cooperation—are envisioned to enable 
working towards a cultural convergence of Europe and Asia in the frame of 
mutually beneficial projects. In the Eurasian identity project that is 
considered to unify “the country of the great steppe”47 nomadic historical 
culture entails a European background and represents the kind of mobility 
that modern connectivity requires. Because the steppe constitutes a large part 
of the Eurasian landmass it is seen as the natural interface of its two parts, 
Europe and Asia. Kazakhstan’s aspirations for development make it a 
cultural space for a normatively-oriented regional leadership, and these 
policies are sharpened with development assistance. As a consequence, 
Afghanistan plays a rather more significant role in Kazakhstani policies than 
might be expected if we consider only the more obvious concerns over
security and instability in its geographic proximity: it is the best example of 
how Kazakhstan’s policies in the regional context are globally oriented. This 
practice, as we have already explained, is helpful in expanding the political 
space for pursuing Kazakhstan’s interests. In Central Asia, specifically, it 
enables Astana to develop its own profile of policies.
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Conclusion: Collaboration to Achieve Mutually 
Complementary Goals 
Since the early 1990s Kazakhstan has assumed an active role in presenting 
initiatives for regional cooperation and settling violent conflicts among the 
former Soviet subjects (examples include Tajikistan’s civil war and Nagorno-
Karabakh), and the war that was ignited in Ukraine in spring 2014 later 
extended this role also to Europe. Instead of being merely formal in nature 
with an emphasis on good services in the traditional mode of diplomatic 
mediation, this role seeks to advance international practices that realize 
Kazakhstan’s interests. Thus, for example, when President Nazarbayev 
emphasizes to European audiences that politics must be separated from 
economics, his message is not merely that the EU should lift the economic 
sanctions it has imposed on Russia because of Russia’s involvement in 
eastern Ukraine. More fundamentally, it is to promote such practices that do 
not obstruct economic interaction for political reasons relating to either 
external alignment or specific policies.48 In fact, Astana’s determination to 
develop economic cooperation both within the EEU and with the EU is, in 
principle, the path that Moscow had recommended for Ukraine when that 
country’s free trade area and the political association agreement in the frame 
of the EU’s Eastern Partnership were being prepared between Kiev and 
Brussels in an accelerated time schedule in late autumn 2013 and early spring 
2014. 
But whereas Ukraine was initially too divided to become an economic 
interface between Russia and Europe, Kazakhstan’s future vision is to make 
its Eurasian space a bridge between the economically rising Far East and the 
West. The role in relation to Russia is merely the current context for 
promoting these general objectives; moreover, it is a context that gives 
Kazakhstan a diplomatic role in Europe. From Moscow’s perspective, the
active role assumed by Astana signals to the West that Moscow is supported 
by its allies; in addition, Kazakhstan’s diplomatic activity is clearing the way 
for the type of non-exclusive policies of economic cooperation which are 
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also in Russia’s interest—especially when its relations with the West have 
been gridlocked through its emphatically military responses (and the borders 
that have been raised through them) and it is itself unable to gain credibility 
for similar policies in the West. This symbiosis in specific issues requires 
that Russia supports stability in Kazakhstan and that issues regarding the 
Russian minority or the northern borders are not brought forth. Any threats to 
Kazakhstan’s stability would spell disaster for Russia not only in Central 
Asia but also for its prospect of improving relations with the Western states. 
Both countries regard the SCO as the main organizational frame for 
expanding their influence in global politics. The repeated mention of the 
organization’s resources as indicated by its vast landmass and the total 
number of the organization’s members and observers—covering about 50 
percent of the world’s population—reveals just how much this organization 
represents a potentiality.49 Although the expanded SCO will be very hetero-
geneous with its Chinese, Russian, Turkic, Persian, Hindu and Muslim cul-
tural influences, it does provide a political space for developing economic 
relations and specific forms of security cooperation in order to maintain re-
gional stability. In autumn 2015 Afghanistan joined Iran in applying for full 
membership, and the organization’s Secretary-General Dmitry Mezentsev 
has revealed that the country has a special place in the agenda due to its im-
portance for regional stability: “Cooperation with Afghanistan must be built 
not only on combating terrorism or drug trafficking but also in the economic, 
cultural and humanitarian spheres.”50 The aim is to help Afghanistan raise 
itself to the status of being a respectable state after two decades of chaos and 
to include it in the organization’s cooperation. This, in turn, will counteract 
Western political influence in the region even if Western military support 
remains necessary. 
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